probably going to "vote Republican for the rest of their lives." "God help me," Solinger closed her review by saying, "I wanted to call out the political correctness police" (1993) .
Of course, when it comes to book reviewers' expectations about narrative journalism these days, polarized reactions are anything but uncommon. The subject of foster care is notoriously contentious in its own right, and it should not surprise us that what Solinger called "personalizing," or seeming to reduce complex social conditions down to individual character traits, should have raised political hackles among liberals. Nevertheless, I have come to think it would be shortsighted to reduce these divergent readerly reactions to merely subjective or ideological responses. Rather, what was interesting here was how reviewers' personal, political, and professional responses were often presaged by literary considerations, as if the foundational interpretive questions were actually about the most effective narrative architecture within which foster care should be addressed. In other words, reviewers typically raised questions like the following: how, exactly, should our sympathy be orchestrated by story-telling about foster care? Does a writer's selection of, say, a particular literary point of view always imply, for instance, a specific class position, a political stance, or the degree of actual, real-world sympathy with his or her subjects? Are there particular social or historical conditions that should always be represented, and what happens when a journalist neglects them? Is it actually possible that a "good read" can simultaneously offend our political sympathies, and how exactly does that happen? And in all, exactly when is it the case, as Gayle Salamon has recently put it, that a narrative about poverty leaves us with the feeling that "it is a derogation of the poor in the guise of a recognition" (2010, 171)-or, in other words, a sentimental rendering that is really just a put-down?
Questions like these, of course, can be terribly abstract. To make them a little more concrete, in this essay I propose to explore specific stylistic elements of Sheehan's Life for Me that seem to have provoked such divergent reactions. However, as I've suggested above, such an exploration might best begin by following the lead of reviewers' readerly intuitions rather than their political inclinations. And reciprocally, rather than treating Sheehan's own aesthetic decisions merely as vehicles for her a priori ideological views, I concentrate, conversely, on how her narrative structure, voice, and interpretive framing come to embody a social or political disposition to which readers reacted so differently. So, to better illuminate what Sheehan is up to, I will contrast her book to another path-breaking, yet quite different account: New York Times reporter Nina Bernstein's The Lost Children of Wilder: The Epic Struggle to Change Foster Care (2001) .
I have decided to counterpoint Sheehan's and Bernstein's books for several reasons. On the one hand, Lost Children has a system-normative story-premise nearly identical to Life for Me: a poor, underage mother of African American descent consents to consigning her infant son to foster care, a concession that actually places both of them in the system. But that being said, the style of Bernstein's text is entirely different from Sheehan's. Rather, Lost Children self-consciously adopts what I will call the "Dickensian" mode that more commonly governs what many readers-including, I would say, some of the reviewers I list above-expect from a journalistic narrative about children and poverty. That is, she employs the grainy, deeply immersive mode of realist chronicle that has come to represent the "novelistic" style most at a premium in contemporary narrative journalism more generally-indeed the mode that most craft talk and criticism on the subject has recently praised.
3 As Bernstein's own favorable reviewers often put it, she chooses a narrative mode that is "exhaustive," and which tries to be heart-wrenchingly "empathetic" yet reform-minded (Traub 2001; Armstrong 2001, 8-9) . 4 In fact, I would say that Bernstein's and Sheehan's books represent, respectively, two of the most prominent modes in contemporary literary journalism: this comprehensive, conventionally novelistic form which puts a premium on a plain-style, humanistic, "history of the present," and the spare, unsentimental, modernist mode that, again, is more commonly identified with the "fly on the wall" traditions of New Yorker reportage.
Meanwhile, contrasting these two modes can also help us begin to unpack the complicated relationships between narrative form, ideological and political views, and readerly interpretation in reportage about poverty. For instance, it is certainly true that the culture-of-poverty hypothesis has frequently inhibited journalistic treatments of inequality by diminishing our sense of the power relationships that shape it; I have written about that pitfall myself (Wilson 1999) . But in fact narrative journalism on foster care interests me precisely for the opposite reason: because, even as these texts so often instruct us just to look at the culture of poverty, it also seems virtually impossible, at least at first, to turn our attention away from the modes of governance to which the poor are subjected. Rather than representing the poor as inhabiting a culture unto themselves, a foster care narrative takes as a "given" that we must see them as they are managed by state and private agencies, indeed to see the poor through what social scientists often call competing "orders" of authority and administration (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) . Readers are therefore not only invited to compare (or supplant) the affective responses of represented parents or caregivers with their own; they are also asked to choose among competing, real-world ways of placing, managing, and caring for the poor. And, importantly, readers are also asked to feel what happens when these modes of governance falter or fail. That is one reason why I suggest that we might think of "orphaning" as referring both to the literal social process and to an effect, not always intentional, of the narrative designs journalists use to represent that process. Much as editors or writers still use "orphan" to refer to words or lines of a paragraph left abandoned on a page, the making of narrative often demands that some characters be left out of view as a writer gives others more stage time, more voice, or more care. In these ways, foster children become not only, in the now-common lament, "orphans of the living." They can also become, at times quite ambiguously, orphans of our own reading.
II
American foster care at the turn of the twenty-first century represents a controversial and diffuse patchwork of social institutions, treatment strategies, and political rationales. As such, it presents enormous challenges to writers of serious reportage. To begin with, journalists must combat the sway of more popular representationschildren's books, Disney serials, Broadway musicals-that continue to feature sentimental and even fairy-tale motifs dramatizing the plight of the lonely orphan within various tales of abandonment, melodramatic rescue, and even vengeance. In Luc Besson's 1994 action film The Professional, for example, a little lost girl even makes common cause with a Mafia hit man. In Besson's arcane but revealing tale, a nearly-illiterate enforcer named Leon (played by Jean Reno) has his world disrupted when he decides to provide shelter for a young neighbor named, as in Roald Dahl's children's book (1988), Matilda: a seemingly delicate 'tweener (Natalie Portman) whose two-bit, drug-dealing, TV-narcoticized family has been murdered by corrupt DEA agents. She comes to Leon looking to acquire his skills and enact revenge. But in the characteristic inversion of the orphan tale, it is Leon who is changed by Matilda-or, rather, changed by caring for her, by cultivating the affection that he has missed in his own lonely life. In the end, she will carry Leon's gift of a small houseplant to a boarding school, taking his implicit advice that she must abandon vengeance and put down new roots. But to set up that finale, Leon must go down in flames killing those badguy DEA agents, telling them his revenge is from Matilda. Similarly, the Nolan brothers' The Dark Knight Rises (2012) closes with Batman killed, but not really, in his own fireball while a bus full of characteristically wide-eyed orphans look on. Having himself been orphaned by a terrible crime, Batman/Bruce Wayne designs his last will and testament so that it will donate his childhood home, Wayne Manor, for use by those orphans. We learn that one of its former charges is soon to become Batman's adopted sidekick Robin. Matilda's school, in fact, looks a little like Wayne Manor, or, alternatively, like Professor Xavier's mansion/school/foster home in various installments of the X-men movie series.
Of course, as Caren Irr has recently observed, Americans don't have to look very far to find a literary heritage chock full of "orphans, foundlings, and changelings" (2014, 385) . The stern but forgiving schoolmarm who ultimately takes in Besson's Matilda, for instance, recalls the spirits of Louisa May Alcott's Plumfield, just as one of Bernstein's characters thinks he sees himself in an American TV adaptation of Oliver Twist (Bernstein 2002, 58, 400) . Crucially, the term "orphan" immediately triggers the presumption that the child at issue is in need of care-or, in the phrase made famous by Charles Dickens, in need of a "more" from both the paternal figures in the story and the reader who measures them. Indeed, many contemporary (and often still sentimental) nonfiction accounts of foster care, some of them by activists or advocates in the field, draw upon the iconic associations of the orphan's "lost" status by simply picturing the child in a gallery of tragedy that seems not to invite comment or analysis, but simple gazing or longing. It is as if readers are invited to mingle their responses, that is, with something like British psychologist's John Bowlby's famous idea of "attachment," the developmental theory that has both permeated modern child welfare care and, ironically, often become the measuring stick for its failures.
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In these kinds of stories, a direct-address lament about systemic neglect is counterbalanced by stage time simply devoted to delineating foster care's victims, and thus encoding and extending the imperative to recursively and extensively fix our gaze on childhood agony. "See those children there?" Jennifer Toth commands in her moving account, Orphans of the Living. "Look into their faces" (1997, 15) .
6 "Orphan" thus is a word that encodes not just a birth status, but a broader social abandonment and, at times, a readerly obligation. Indeed, the term "orphan" often outlives its literal reference point, since it is still too commonly used to designate a child whose parents are very much alive.
For these and other reasons, then, the cognate term "foundling"-a label that points to social incorporation, rather than abandonment-is perhaps a more telling key to the system of foster care that arose, after all, in Dickens's era, and upon which the American variant would be modeled. The term's own legendary residues tell us much about the system's ideological foundations. As Jenny Bourne Taylor (2001) writes, the British vocabulary of "foundlings" was premised on the fantasy of a supposedly abandoned child preconceived as a blank being forsaken by his or her biological parents. As the thinking went at the time, the "found" child was then re-conceived as a blank slate upon whom the values of a new social "family" could supposedly be inscribed. This was the thinking, in turn, so mocked by Dickens, through figures like Sissy Jupe of Hard Times (1845)-even as his orphan, once again, healed her supposed benefactors in the end.
The reality behind these sentimental castings, of course, was a much grimmer affair. Victorian fostering typically involved the confinement of an indigent mother forced to cede authority to her child's new patrons, and to the state, precisely as Bernstein's and Sheehan's protagonists must. As scholars such as James Smith (2007) have shown us, this was a process that often involved the quarantining of the sexually unmanageable or religiously shamed; terribly onerous and unremunerated labor forced upon such figures; and a broader, community silence effected by collusion between church and state and even birth families themselves. Even when a birth mother capitulated to the available Victorian vocabularies of seduction and abandonment, the situation could not help but express an intrinsic contradiction at the heart of this system: that a modernizing society heralding the bonding force of the family nevertheless erected systems for the poor that could end up disrupting those very bonds. And it is a contradiction that has persisted to the present day (e.g., Rutter and O'Connor 1999, 824-826, 830; Beam 2013, 36) . "I thought my life that was just started was being ended," Sheehan's Crystal will astutely say (1993a, 9), commenting on the irony of being placed into a system of "foster care" after she has, herself, become a mother.
Crystal's comment also suggests how today's foster care system often seems to defy the logic supposedly governing it. Even foster "homes" (meaning private domiciles) are far less common than some may think. These days, licensed "foster families" care for less than half of all children in foster care, and the role of such families has generally not kept pace with growing need, especially in cities and among families of color ("Foster Care" 2008) . Instead, the foster-care "system" is better understood, as I have said, as a patchwork of services and institutions with widely different objectives and rationales: group homes, Residential Treatment Centers, psychiatric hospitals, Independent Living or bridge apartments, and more. This patchwork reflects the fact that, since the early 1970s, a nominally federalist system has taken hold, in which Congressional regulations or incentives have been imposed upon what were originally state, county, or local systems. Those local care operations, in turn, had historically worked through private and typically religious institutions of varied kinds. 7 The inter-relationships among these layers are therefore often complex, cumbersome and competitive: for example, each institution involved in a given foster case must track the tedious and even redundant payments that move across federal, state, and local systems, while also (putatively) respecting each player's rights to privacy or legal representation along the way. On top of all that, in a single foster care case in New York City, every key person is typically assigned a social worker (Beam 2013, 11) . Passing the buck on such matters, alas, is not uncommon: in New York City, Cris Beam tells us, the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) contracts with some thirty different foster care agencies, but then largely tries to withdraw from any direct role in care (2013, 5) .
Hovering over all of the above are the shifting pressure systems of an unstable national political climate. Recently, the conservative rhetoric of protecting "the family," for instance, has increasingly led to federal and state monies being funneled more toward adoption and kinship care (Bartholet 1999, 89) . While this trend has placed more emphasis on reuniting the biological family, the goal said to be guiding foster care from its earliest days, in fact as many as a third of children so reunited eventually end up back in the system (Bartholet 1999, 83) . Biological parents and foster care families, meanwhile, often enter the system at cross-purposes, often at great pain to themselves and to each other. And foster care involves much more than supervising the care of children. Institutions and caregivers in the patchwork can find themselves supervising a given client's sexual behavior, or trying to inculcate the values of work discipline or birth-family cohesion; sadly, in the name of cultivating self-esteem, even the best intentions of care can result in passing along shame. Or, sometimes, working in a competing direction, a given way station may also try to teach its foster charges independence or economic self-sufficiency, goals often in tension with the selfsame idiom of institutional supervision and domestic cohesiveness to which foster children are subjected. And needless to say, matters of Native American sovereignty or undocumented immigrant status can further complicate care.
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Foster care can thus generate great emotional strains on top of those that landed people in its institutional networks in the first place. Among these effects: physical separation from loved ones; the humiliations of state and institutional oversight, too often including physical and sexual abuse; potentially confused racial or ethnic identifications; loss of economic opportunity; and vastly different experiences of care. Racial imbalances in the system, compounded by the devastating effects of poverty, drug epidemics, decaying housing and discrimination, are profound. In New York City at the end of the 1990s, only about three percent of the children under foster care were white, even though they represented a figure ten times that in the overall population (Roberts 2002, 9) . And conversely, as one scholarly overview puts it, "research data [also] shows that minorities are more likely to be reported for maltreatment [in families of origin], to have these reports substantiated, to be removed from their families, receive fewer services and lower financial support, remain in care longer, and are less likely to be reunified with their families." Though research is still ongoing, incarceration and homelessness are also commonly thought to be frequent outcomes for former foster care charges ("Foster Care" 2008) .
Given these contexts, it is little wonder that Hollywood representations of "orphans" seem to reflect such contradictory values: abandonment and rescue, love and vengeance, care and self-destructiveness. Indeed, that lost twins, siblings, or foundlings often become the dark knights of our popular imagination may simply reflect the broader social frustrations this system invokes on all sides. And such emotional turmoil itself begins to suggest the challenges for any work of literary journalism to give this system a coherent explanatory, much less narrative, architecture.
III
Faced with such a mélange of institutions, policy disputes, and regional variations, little wonder that Bernstein reached for the sprawling, wide-angle, panoramic variation of the Dickensian mode. In fact, Bernstein's heavily documented account repeatedly likens its story to Dickens's Bleak House (1853). In contrast to the slim austerity of Sheehan's 171-page book, The Lost Children of Wilder's 442 pages use a long-historical, chronological chronicle; the book features an ensemble plot with dozens of players; and it offers a legal history alongside its central story of a mother and her son.
But despite the colloquial ways we might use the label "Dickensian" today, mere sentiment is not, in fact, Bernstein's objective. Though Bernstein certainly aims to embody sympathy in her narrative persona, she also aims to convey moral discernment, primarily by placing her densely articulated social detail within a narrative architecture of retrospect and consensus. In its classic nineteenth-century form of this mode, as Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth has suggested (1983, 35-6, 67, 71, 91) , novelists typically began by opening the reader to the interpretive problem of divergent perspectives and even parallel realities in the social whole. But then, the authorial strategy was to weave those realities together, thereby achieving the appearance of consensual understanding. In novels like Hard Times, for example, this totalizing perspective was often provoked, in Raymond Williams's (1966, 96) classic estimate, by Dickens's own feeling of having "seen through" social systems, reformist ambitions, and legal folly in their entirety. Such an expansive and yet penetrating mode thus allowed room for both sentiment and satire. Even more importantly, the "fellow feeling" cultivated with lower-class characters or lost children was typically accompanied by deep skepticism about institutional charities whose cold, bureaucratic or utilitarian schemes paled, a Dickensian novel asks us to feel, next to acts of individual kindness (see Yousef 2009 ).
The heart of Bernstein's somber story is a decades-long antidiscrimination case brought in 1972 against the New York foster care system by a group led by American Civil Liberties Union lawyer Marcia Lowry. The suit claimed that New York City's long-standing reliance on private religious institutions for foster care was both discriminatory and inequitable. Bernstein details this case by tracing the experiences of both an impoverished black mother and her male child implicated in the case's filing, and by documenting, more widely, the emotional experience of adoptive families, counselors, and lawyers alike. Along the way, Bernstein's narrative governs its wide-ranging structure by using what journalists, literary critics and media analysts alike call framing, the oscillating between grainy scene-setting and evaluative digression that Mark Kramer famously described as the sine qua non of novelistic literary journalism (1995). Bernstein's voice is adjudicating, sensible, but also distanced, at times, to the point of irony. And her book ends much as Bleak House does: by suggesting a lack of any real change despite her reformers' efforts. Bernstein thus builds her microcosmic story up into something like a monumental tragedy, edged in private pain and institutional failure.
Although this tragedy is recreated gradually through narrative retrospect, its characteristic tonal mixture of sentiment and fatalism is actually installed from the beginning. For instance, Bernstein's title, The Lost Children of Wilder, signals that mixed tone by referring both to a literal family and to the shorthand for the plaintiffs in the book's class-action suit. We soon discover that the split in reference is quite meaningful. That is, we begin with one variety of the literary orphaning I have suggested: the literal Wilder children, the teenager Shirley Wilder and her son Lamont, are actually all but absent from the larger legal case taken up in their name. Furthermore, the design of Lost Children's plot accentuates the emotional distance the system produces between the two generations actually holding the Wilder name. For most of her book's beginning, that is, Bernstein focuses on Shirley. We see Shirley summoned to family court in 1972: we see the presiding judge beginning to leaf through her file, while Shirley herself wonders-in a truly Dickensian touch-whether she can go home for Christmas Day (Bernstein 2002, 7) . From there, we follow Shirley through several foster care venues: family court, juvenile detention, hospital care, residential treatment, and more, all the while she is separated from her baby son legally and geographically. Then, however, Bernstein leaves Shirley behind and begins to turn to Lamont's experience. We see Lamont's early years with three different foster families, all ending badly; then learn of his stay at Blaine Hall, actually not a hall or a home but a psychiatric hospital (235, 254); and ultimately, we see him placed at a residential treatment center named Astor Home after its original philanthropic donor (292, 295).
Again, Bernstein's goal is to be comprehensive, and to be attentive to the politics of foster care without "reduc[ing her] characters to ciphers in a policy debate" (Kugelman 2001, 26) . And yet, the challenges are many: along with recounting the Wilder case itself, Bernstein uses the Victorian "consensual" mode to range across genders and generations, regions and institutions, mother and son. For instance, because her real-time entry into this project came some eighteen years after Shirley's first hearing, Bernstein is forced to reconstruct Shirley's case primarily by sifting through secondary reports, evaluations and memories available from the foster-care professionals, paraprofessionals, and rank amateurs who had overseen the young girl's care. If only to set up a contrast with Sheehan in following section of this essay, I would note here that Bernstein scrupulously identifies those caregivers, sometimes giving them capsule biographies and carefully attributing their judgments. The literary characterization of Shirley, nevertheless, is deeply mediated by time and by foster treatment itself.
And because the New York foster-care system relies on private religious institutions, it is usually the incongruities between various treatment plans that Bernstein makes apparent. That is, claiming grounds of religious freedom, those private agencies (e.g., Catholic or Jewish charities) would not often take in African American children unless contracted to do so; that's the heart of the legal case. And as a result, we see the nominally Protestant fourteen-year-old Shirley routed to a Catholic residential treatment center, and we see the discrepancies among religious, psychoanalytic, moral, or transparently subjective analyses that follow. For instance, we encounter a well-meaning Catholic nun in Hudson, New York who wants to teach her new charge the responsibilities of motherhood (Bernstein 2002, 125) . The system, in this incarnation, attempts to inculcate norms of mothering even as it has actually deprived Shirley of her child; this Sister tries to promote chastity, as well, while Shirley is smuggling condoms into her ward (129). Or, as another example, we hear a probation officer describe how Shirley sees herself as autonomous, unafraid, and mature. But then we hear how that expert actually writes his report about her, in a colder, more psychoanalytic, and less forgiving discourse: "Shirley is a very deeply troubled and disturbed youngster" who, the officer speculates, may "in her neurotic subconscious" fear she will cause others around her to die (97).
One might or might not agree with these assessments. But in any case, Shirley comes across as a young woman who often seems unable to testify on her own behalf. To the reader, that is, Shirley thus becomes a something of a narrative orphan because the caregivers supervising her deem her too young to understand or face her situation. However, it is not really that Bernstein's Dickensian mode cedes Shirley's "case" to these caregivers. For in truth it is Bernstein's narrative voice, of course, which has been sifting, reconciling, or exposing gaps in their very partial accounts, and in Shirley's own account, all along the way. As Ermarth tells us, this is how such a book produces holistic dimensionality: the rival views of or by a subject invariably seem incomplete in contrast to the text's fuller, coordinated overview (1983, (19) (20) (21) 47) . Every time those external reports on Shirley seem beside the point, obtuse, or one-dimensional, that is, Bernstein's voice comes to seem more humane than the experts she summarizes. And of course Bernstein can turn distance in time to her advantage: she acquires, that is, the asset of retrospection that, in real time, Shirley's care managers and even Shirley herself cannot benefit from.
Moreover, Bernstein eventually had Lamont, as Shirley did not. That is, as the middle third of the book emerges, Bernstein indeed reconstructs the fate of Shirley's child, but not only from second-hand sources. Rather, she has the benefit of dozens of direct conversations with Lamont. Bernstein's book thus becomes a conduit for the lost boy's own anger and mourning. As if strengthened by Bernstein's ability to move into his inner life and his sense of loss, Lamont in fact begins to blossom both as a source and as a character. Lost Children in this second movement thus becomes even more fully Dickensian, in that its imagery, mood, and emotional tenor is filtered increasingly through the "buried store of anger, guilt, and anxiety" that children like Lamont otherwise hold back (Bernstein 2002, 255) , and the distance readers are asked to feel from parental care and understanding. Bowlby's theories of attachment, in fact, are subsequently cited to buttress that very interpretation of Lamont's state of mind (257). Conversely, the character called Shirley can again seem as remote to us as the real one does to Lamont: she is comparatively flat, distant, unspeaking, and can even seem flighty.
Bernstein's story even begins to collaborate with the metaphorical texture of Lamont's own quite-lyrical memory. We encounter the Dickensian imagery of haunting, the landscape of cemeteries, the conflation of lost parentage with the loss of childhood:
Often, at dusk, when he saw the old cemetery outlined against a lowering sky beyond the playing fields, Lamont felt more vulnerable and more alone than ever. Then he was sure that Astor Home was haunted. It was haunted, he thought, by the suffering of other children, long dead or long forgotten. (Bernstein 2002, 312) Later on, Bernstein will look at Shirley through Lamont's eyes, and see her as someone "like a lost child or an unquiet ghost" (414), a being who can neither hold nor be held by her child. But readers are given the pleasures Shirley is not: of embracing the heart of the foundling themselves, the lost boy who seems to have been ceded, through Bernstein's collaboration, moderate power to write on his own blank slate. Retrospect both illuminates the gaps and suggests their irreconcilability: here, it is as if the painful inadequacies of Shirley's childhood are restored to the reader through Lamont, and thus made even more tragic.
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It is the return of this lost boy-or rather, I would say, the return of his lost-ness-that prepares readers for the lack of closure in Lost Children's finale. In the personal subplot, the reader learns that Lamont and Shirley do in fact meet once again. But their strained reunion only underscores the futility of the system because their mutual estrangement simply becomes more visible to both. At first, Bernstein reconstructs both their hopes and their perceptions on a street that, despite its twentieth-century setting, might easily be Dickens's London:
They first recognized each other across four lanes of traffic. Shirley Wilder saw the baby she'd lost to foster care stride toward her as a tall young man of nearly nineteen. Lamont saw that the slim woman in jeans, with tears running down her face, was the mother he'd never known. Speeding cars were nothing compared to the years of yearning, guilt, and anger bridged by that first embrace in the middle of Gun Hill Road. (Bernstein 2002, 379) Bernstein quickly follows up, however, by saying that mother and son are actually "the closest of strangers" (379), an oxymoron that recapitulates the story-telling DNA of Lost Children as a whole. Despite what these two have in common, that is, dark emotions of regret, guilt, and anger still hang between them. The power of retrospect itself, in fact, allows the reader to recall the tragedies these two each have experienced, in parallel: early sexual abuse, parental maltreatment and abandonment, and deeply inadequate institutional care. As a result, neither has ever sufficiently matured, a limitation Bernstein reveals to us by looking through Lamont's disappointed eyes. Shirley strikes him, that is, as still prone to confuse her sexuality with her autonomy; a victim of childhood abuse himself while in foster care, he recoils from what he interprets as an inappropriate moment with her. Closure is therefore something neither the system nor the narrative itself can provide. Bernstein instead settles on irony: grimly but appropriately enough, eventually it is Lamont's own child who will be named the plaintiff, the new Wilder, in yet another new legal suit to be brought against the foster care system. This bleak, Dickensian parallel between the unmet needs of the personal realm and the inadequacy of institutions works all the more fully because of the effects Bernstein's form has created. Among them: the ability of her narrative voice to achieve consensual authority where little agreement actually existed in real time; to collaborate with Lamont's sense of loss, and form a new attachment with her readers; to make time seem as if it has come full circle, undercutting the hopes of all concerned. All of these devices, that is, compel readers to share Bernstein's own sense of grief and futility, to share in Lamont's orphaning, while outside of the text, the new baby Wilder will simply go on wailing.
IV
So far, however, I have been talking about literary orphaning as a result of the stage time denied to particular characters, or of the effects of diminishing their voice. Collaterally, I have said that journalists' collaboration with an orphan-informant can channel his or her sense of loss into an overarching narrative motif of disenfranchisement. I have suggested, as well, how a Dickensian foster care narrative's mood of emotional abandonment often builds upon an exposure of the carelessness of caregivers, or of the limitations of their interpretive vocabularies or vantage points. But of course just about all of these effects are customarily contingent upon what, again, we call expository framing: the explanatory, contextual digressions the literary journalist uses for constructing historical background, panoramic perspective, or the appearance of consensus. Imagine what happens, then, when such framing is withdrawn, as it is, usually, in Sheehan's Life for Me.
Primarily, of course, this difference reflects the fact that Sheehan's comparatively lean book is indebted to modernist rather than Victorian techniques. One might even say Life for Me is more Hemingwayesque than Dickensian: executed predominantly through fourth-wall, dramatic narration, or what Sheehan has called her "third person invisible," the book emulates the spare, abstract, withholding mode adapted to New Yorker reportage by the likes of Lillian Ross and John Hersey. As in these earlier writers' work, emotional turmoil and even interior thought is largely left unsaid amidst the chaos of experience, at most to be glimpsed beneath the glinting surface of apparently neutral facts. Explicit political judgments also seem to be disdained.
11 And along with denying the reader detailed access to its characters' interior lives, Life for Me fragments the familiar plot architecture of linear chronology in ways that can also thwart readerly identification.
In its title and title character, of course, Sheehan's book alludes to the famous refrain in the modernist-era poem by Langston Hughes, "Mother to Son" (1922) , and its memorable testimony by a mother who stumbles and struggles as she tries to make progress upward. In itself, the adoption of that story-framework to Life for Me lends itself to stopping and starting rather than linear continuity. But Sheehan takes her allusion and doubles down on Hughes's nearly-cubist fracturing: now, she fashions a book in which, as her own mother protagonist says, beginnings and endings often reverse positions, and time itself seems to run backwards. At first, as with Bernstein's Shirley, we are introduced to Crystal, the young mother of only fourteen, after she gives birth to a baby boy. We then hear that he will be placed in foster care while she herself is sent to a group home. But then, as the book decides to leave Crystal's story behind, instead of turning to the boy, Sheehan ratchets narrative time back to the early life of Crystal's mother, Florence. As if in another allusion to Hughes's poem, the book suddenly becomes "crystalline" in structure: "for" Florence, as much as it is for Crystal.
These modernist effects, of course, bring considerable interpretive risks. The effect of the turn back to Florence's childhood can be disorienting, to say the least, on its own. Little wonder, then, that disapproving reviewers thought they detected an implicit argument about cyclical, pathological poverty at the very heart of Sheehan's design. Even prior to the narrative's pivot in time, in fact, our view of Florence has been anything but reassuring. From the start, the reader has watched her bring marijuana to her daughter in the maternity ward (Sheehan 1993a, 8) ; discovered that Florence has herself been a heroin and cocaine addict (4); and, learned that she has frequently subjected her daughter to beatings (10). To be sure, it may well be that Sheehan's turning the narrative back in time has goals beyond merely providing an historical parallel, or in effect a freezing of time. That is, she may be asking her readers to undergo an erasure of their prior judgments, or to experience a neutralizing effect, as Crystal's mother is turned back into the daughter Florence once was. Now, therefore, any prior condemnation of Florence can seem, abruptly, unearned or premature. In other words, Sheehan's intention may have been to ask readers to re-set the interpretive stance, or even the moral disapproval, they may have already been applying to Crystal herself. As Sheehan's favorable reviewers see it, she may be asking readers to refuse a "point of view" in the sense of judgment.
We may, of course, go along with Sheehan's modernist plan or we may not. But the additional difficulty, I think, is that it can now seem as if the daughter has been doubly abandoned, by her mother and also by her writer. Indeed, as more negative reviewers complained, even the plotting of Crystal's "life" can seem to counteract any simple attachments a reader might be forming to the young woman herself. Supposedly moving upwards through foster care's ladder turns out to be chaotic and sometimes regressive movement. Just when it seems that Crystal's life is on an uptick, she falters: for example, as she is moving out of a group home into an independent-living facility, readers hear that she and her roommate "broke the rules of the independent-living apartment at once" (Sheehan 1993a, 66) . Or, when Crystal gets an after-school job at a bargain goods store, Sheehan's subsequent paragraph starts with: "A week or two after she started there, she found more lucrative employment when Furman, a Jamaican with short dreadlocks who supplied Crystal with weed and tried unsuccessfully to date her, offered her five hundred dollars plus expenses to carry half a pound of cocaine to Washington, D.C." (67). As Sheehan's intentionally tumbling syntax indicates, Crystal literally becomes a character with stops and starts, and thus hard to assess. It is not only that, in contrast to Bernstein's Lamont, Crystal does not have her interior life enriched by free indirect discourse that might have elevated her musings into poetic motif. Rather, it is that the modernist quest for "authenticity," in these moments, generates a disposition of detachment that all but disables the conclusions, or perhaps the hope, the reader might invest in Crystal's experiences.
Most characteristically, this disposition is constructed by Sheehan's own apparently reticent, withholding voice. As in her other books, Sheehan favors here a flat, seemingly neutral diction, especially when laying out the particulars of the foster care system. As a result, the bureaucratic routines of New York are made to seem dull and impersonal. Quite often, in fact, it will seem as if Sheehan were simply summarizing a boring office manual. Or, she will boil rules or regulations down for her reader, oversimplifying their nuances, as if she feels-performing a kind of modernist "blasé"-that grainier detailing would just prove too baffling.
12 Or, consider the tone of Sheehan's description of the processes starting up right after Crystal has surrendered her child:
In 1984, babies about to be placed in foster care in New York City went through an Allocations Unit. About ten percent were sent to families that had been licensed by the city and were directly monitored by employees of the city's Human Resources Administration; the rest were sent to voluntary agencies that had foster-care contracts with the city. Voluntary agencies employed their own "intake" workers (who screened and accepted children), social workers, nurses, and other personnel; their paperwork was monitored by the city. (Sheehan 1993a, 17-18) Despite having just described a crushing separation of mother and child, Sheehan resorts above to a virtual draining of her own affective response. Moreover, in the passage above, she does not assess the legality or the morality of such processes; nor does she seem to judge the skill set of each player in the process, or the efficiency of the bureaucratic whole. Like the abstract and absent city itself, readers seem to be left simply to "monitor" these facts rather than being guided by expository digression or framing.
Meanwhile, in contrast to Bernstein, Sheehan often does not infer or interpolate the interior thoughts of her foster-care administrators, a choice which tends to give their descriptions a hard, seemingly impenetrable surface rather than the illusion of realistic roundness (another name Sheehan invents is "Diamond").
13 Also in contrast to Bernstein, Sheehan will characteristically remove attribution, much as New Yorker writers like Hersey had, or leave unsaid the sources or documents behind her recounting of events. Resorting to anonymity or, similarly, using flat characterization of a speaker, can also produce an aura of neutrality or facticity, as in "a social worker commented" (Sheehan 1993a, 35) . To my ear, even Sheehan's verb tenses can read like a singular layer of time. For example, she refers to Social Service regulations by explaining that "before foster parents are certified, they must agree to let birth parents see the children in their care regularly-usually once a week" (140). Here, it can seem as if such regulations are frozen in time, a permanent present. Everything is cast as it just, ostensibly, "is" or "was."
Despite what her admirers suggest, however, these effects often go well beyond simple transparency of fact; nor is the recurrent description of her technique as "invisibility" terribly precise. Rather, Sheehan's voice relies on what is more accurately described as radical understatement, the technique that draws attention to its denatured, denuded tone and presence. Importantly, upon a second look, her interpretive freight is rather easily discerned. When, for instance, Sheehan writes that "it was financially to [foster mother] Margaret Hargrove's advantage to maintain six children in residence" (1993a, 57), it's hardly difficult to draw the inference. Or, for instance, there is Sheehan's description of the men and women in one rehab program:
A critical part of Odyssey House's drug-rehabilitation program is to make residents confront the reasons for their addiction. Most of them have led lives of deprivation. A significant percentage have been physically abused, sexually abused, or severely neglected. Sixty-eight percent of the adults in the program are second-or third-generation substance abusers. Seventy-five percent of the female residents have children in the foster-care system or living with grandmothers. According to the president of Odyssey House, the men who fathered these children perceive their role as impregnating the women and carrying around photographs of the children in their pockets. (Sheehan 1993a, 133) To be fair, Sheehan attempts to mute her final implication by its attribution to Odyssey House's unidentified president. But I think her sarcasm is meant to sneak up on us precisely because of the way it is camouflaged, and hidden by the dispiriting array of facts and statistics preceding it. Meanwhile, as in "maintain six children in residence" (57), the aloof abstraction of her diction-"lives of deprivation" or "impregnating"-actually only underscores the shock because, as in modernist modes, distance only underscores actual horror or disbelief.
Finally, it is not merely that Sheehan's protagonist is seen with often-aloof distance. Rather it is that, collaterally, Crystal's own seemingly blasé temperament can further disrupt a reader's attachment to her. For instance, when Sheehan tells us about Crystal's relationship with the young man named Diamond, we hear about their dates to Coney Island, that they made love, and that "Crystal becomes wistful and teary" when she talks about their days together. But then Crystal tries to compliment her former lover by illustrating how caring he was: " 'He'd be busy selling drugs but he'd stop to call a cab to take us home from the movies. He made me feel good about myself'" (Sheehan 1993a, 49) . In instances like these, Sheehan's characters seem to indict themselves so that the narrator doesn't have to. And once again, Sheehan's own distance often only accentuates the disconnection her readers are directed to feel when her character expresses an inappropriate reaction. For example, when Crystal complains about the strict regulations at a high school she attends, Sheehan adds an explanation:
"Usually, [Crystal says,] I got written up for every little thing-like cutting some guy with a pocket knife after gym class-and the dean was unreasonable. She told me to drop out and go get my G.E.D., like I was a dog." (The G.E.D is the General Equivalency Diploma for high school.) (Sheehan 1993a, 50) Reviewers like Rodriguez (1993) and Kirp (1994) were right, I think, to pause over the "raised-monocle" tone suggested by Sheehan's assumption that her reader needs to know what a G.E.D. is. But again, we shouldn't bypass the stylistic effects of the text's radical understatement here. That is, though Sheehan might seem to resist commenting directly, it's clear that she actually directs her readers to be shocked, in part by juxtaposing the fragmentary shard about self-help and education against Crystal's inured response to violence: to Crystal, knifing someone seems no big deal. Rather than supplementing the metaphorical textures of her informant's memory, as Bernstein does, Sheehan uses Crystal's dissociation to set up the narrative's withholding vacuum of disbelief. These incongruous responses are even structurally calibrated to the book as a whole. For instance, "THE BEAUTIFULEST MOTHER IN THE WORLD," the subtitle for the second half of Life for Me, turns out to be Crystal's description of Florence when she got high following her regular fix (100).
Needless to say, then, there also seems to be a noticeable difference from the style of the collaboration we saw with Bernstein and Lamont. In person, Sheehan may indeed have thought of herself as "liking" Crystal and even admiring her. But if Sheehan was Crystal's friend in real time, the author is also rather unsparing when she does offer up her judgments in her text. "Crystal is fickle," we hear in Life for Me, "and most of her sexual relationships have been fleeting" (Sheehan 1993a, 43) . Or, "Crystal was highly goal-resistant" (55), we are told, right after a list of program goals. Or, there is the moment when Sheehan tells her readers that both Crystal and Florence vow not to let their children be swallowed up by the system they are entangled in. Fair enough. But then, when Florence fails to take back her children after they are discharged from foster care, Sheehan also remarks that " [Florence] made it clear that her idea of motherhood was similar to Crystal's: let the former foster parents keep the children as often as possible" (157). These moments add up, and attempts at humor don't alleviate their judgmental aftertaste. After learning that Crystal had wanted to improve her physique by enrolling in a health spa, and yet going there only twice, Sheehan observes: "She got more exercise in bed" (89-90). Given that Sheehan is talking about an unwed mother of African American descent, little can muffle the potential dynamite at work here.
In all, therefore, Sheehan's book can seem almost designed to invite the criticism it received. However, by prioritizing her style, I have also tried to suggest why it would also be simplistic to reduce Life for Me to an a priori political stance or simple upper-class snobbery (e.g., the idea that Sheehan and her New Yorker readers were secretly Republican). Nor, in turn, do I think the charge of "personalizing" is ultimately very helpful. In the Dickensian mode, of course, we are more accustomed to having every attribute of personhood contextualized, positioned in relation to the system at hand, and carefully measured in retrospect. And with that, as I've said, given the sentimental iconography of foundlings, lost dreams, and so forth, we commonly assume that a spirit of personal sympathy or charity follows. But the very point of Sheehan's modernist mode, alternatively, is to reflect the fragmented and often-dissociated character of Crystal's experience, both as it seemed to Sheehan herself and, in turn, how Crystal herself seemed to respond to being governed by the foster care system in the first place. Indeed, that Sheehan's Crystal, and perhaps Crystal herself, do not conform to our more familiar Dickensian script should not lead us to conclude that Life for Me is indifferent to her plight, nor that Crystal's "personality" is the problem. On the contrary, Sheehan's very point may be that Crystal's individuality resists subjection to the governance and the morality imposed upon her by others. Despite all the denigration and disorder that foster care adds into her life, Crystal resolutely believes, as the lead section subtitle of Life for Me declares, "I is lovable." This may not be Lamont's uncannily lyrical metaphoricity, to be sure, but it is a resilient voice, and it shows how Crystal refuses, in ways that Lamont sometimes does not, to use the system's judgment of her as her own standard of self-appraisal. In particular, she refuses its persistent shaming in ways, in my view, that Lamont often does not.
14 Ultimately, in fact, that resilience points to one of the most unexpected effects of Life for Me's quite intentional desire to position its protagonist against a bland, distant, dysfunctional system. As we follow the missteps and the crises and the false resolutions of Crystal's experience, the book often seems to relegate the foster care system itself into a backdrop readers are actually liable to forget about for significant chunks of their reading time. Crystal does express gratitude to certain treatment centers, and the guidance they have offered her: Sheehan would point to that help herself, when Rodriguez's negative review overlooked it (see Rodriguez 1993; Sheehan 1993b) . Nevertheless, for much of the book, the foster care system can easily seem like a distant aunt, or a relative with a place to crash temporarily-with some good intentions, perhaps, but also some crackpot and contradictory requirements about how its charges should behave. Even though a few social workers are quoted in Life for Me, Sheehan makes them seem easily forgotten when Crystal is trying to placate her mother, get a job, ward off a violent boyfriend, and on and on. One might say that Sheehan has effected a kind of reverse-orphaning of foster care itself. In these ways, moreover, Sheehan's design actually illuminates something we all too often overlook: that structural conditions of inequality intrude not only upon family life or an adolescent's growth but also on the implementation of governance itself (see Steinberg 2001) . There just isn't space for the foster care system, we come to feel, in the disorder of Crystal's days. Or, we might add, in the life she desperately tries to keep, start, order-for herself.
V
It goes without saying, of course, that the contrast I have established between these two texts cannot encompass the entire range of narrative modes available to those who write nonfictional accounts of poverty. Sheehan's goal of cool, dispassionate abstraction might have been compared to the often-physical, immersive tradition of "down-and-out" voyages by Stephen Crane, George Orwell, or Barbara Ehrenreich; Bernstein's historical chronicle could be contrasted to the looser mixture of documentarian excess and testimonial epiphany of a James Agee or a William T. Vollman. The traditionally local, intensely focused idiom of The New Yorker itself now ranges into the panoramic, cross-continental, and self-reflexive excursions of a William Finnegan, while the Dickensian mode can be made more economical, pared down to the "nonfiction novel" form exemplified by Alex Kotlowitz's There Are No Children Here (1991) .
I might also have applied additional considerations to Bernstein's and Sheehan's own texts: for example, about what it means for female journalists to adapt narrative forms more commonly associated with male writers, or about how well these two coordinate race, class, ethnicity, or gender in relation to the systemic biases that persist in contemporary foster care. I might have said more about whether their focus on New York diverts our eye from the issues that arise, again, in border states or on Native American reservations. Meanwhile, our habit of thinking about poverty through singular "systems" may come at the expense of seeing the interconnections between foster care and other orders of governance, or as part of what some call the "archipelago" of domination (Smith 2007) . Indeed, some of the contradictory effects in the stories of a Shirley or a Crystal or a Lamont may be a result of the local antagonisms, different care strategies, and rival ideological assumptions that populate the different "systems" that adopt and re-orphan them. As wide-ranging as Bernstein's account is, for instance, it brushes up only briefly (2002, 433) against foster care's connections to the neoconservative turn in the criminal justice system that has had such devastating effects on juveniles, poor families, and neighborhoods (see Wilson 2010) . And as timely as these books remain, even the most contemporary of journalistic exposés can quickly become dated, as controversies around birth control and abortion, "race-matching," immigration or gender identification reshape the already complex terrain of foster care.
I am reluctant, however, to assert the all-too-familiar critical response to journalistic exposés: to ask them to cover more, go further, dive deeper. I worry particularly because this default response, implicitly privileging immersion or exhaustive reporting, too often is taken as tantamount to endorsing a certain style of book as well. As Salamon has written, even the praise of "transparent" or supposedly "unadorned" prose often has the effect of uncritically reinforcing empiricist thinking, thereby divorcing stylistic considerations from matters of content. Not only does this conventional wisdom put a premium on the accumulation of detail for its own sake; it privileges the idea of the journalist as passively transcribing events without reference to prior literary traditions. 15 Alternatively, by attending to the specifics of narrative technique above, I have meant to suggest how literary journalists, in effect, may remodel inherited narrative modes so as to address specific features of social and political systems, cultivate or challenge readerly expectations, and construct different styles of social sentiment and engagement. Through matters of plotting and chronology, the presence or withdrawal of authoritative digression, or the resiliency or voice or imagination writers attribute to their informants, different narrative modes also often signal different working relationships with social informants; they invite different affective responses from readers, ranging from attachment to disaffiliation or what I have called "orphaning"; and rather than implementing a pre-determined ideological agenda, they can model social and cultural dispositions that are both made and re-imagined in journalistic practice and reading itself. In other words, attending to these technical modes details the ways that, as Michael Broersma (2010) has suggested, journalistic authority is actually performed, both as an aesthetic and social practice.
There are limits and partiality to any such mode. Bernstein's remodeling of Bleak House certainly exhibits the virtuosity and emotional power of her selected form. The grim parallel she establishes between the outcome of "the Wilders" and "Wilder" exposes a profound set of tragedies in the late-twentieth-century attempts to reform New York foster care through the law, and about the inequalities of race, in particular, that persist in and through that system. In part by collaborating with her main character, Lamont Wilder, it might be said that Bernstein tries to pull him away from the system, and even from the legal advocates that abstracted his life into a class-action "case." That being said, we cannot assume that repurposing the classical aesthetic strategies of the nineteenth-century novel will perfectly suit the conditions of the twenty-first century. For example, by positioning its narrator as an observer who not only witnesses and sympathizes, but who often sees through caregivers, reformers and legal advocates, even Bernstein's impressive account sometimes posits a nostalgic and utopian reassurance of personal, holistic care that, alas, only the reading experience seems able to (temporarily) provide. Indeed, Bernstein may only have found herself inheriting the contradictory position some scholars, such as Lauren Goodlad, have attributed to Dickens himself, in that she found herself "demand[ing] effective governance [from the state] only to be confounded by . . . liberal predilections" in herself that resisted state-centered solutions in the first place (Goodlad 2003, 549 ; see also Yousef 2009 ). The Dickensian mode may only serve to re-enact this classic liberal contradiction even when, at a more conscious level, a writer is repulsed by the conservative strategies only too willing to take advantage of it, and thereby defund the very institutions the writer has hoped to reform.
16
As I have said, Life for Me surely offers few of the more conventional pleasures of literary or political sentiment, and for that it will surely continue to invite some readers' ire. Indeed, Sheehan's modernist, dispassionate style is designed both as a riposte to a literary strategy like Bernstein's and, more generally, to the wider tendency to enlist public "gazing" simply by presenting a foster child's supposedly intrinsic invitation to be cared for. However, my main point has been that Sheehan's various effects nevertheless do perform a disposition, and an often-problematic one, even when they try to appear not to. Consciously and otherwise, in fact, her effects of incongruity and irony can easily open themselves up to the application of middle-class norms-at times, as I've suggested, quite normative notions of motherhood or child-rearing or personal advancement. Indeed, much as in her crack about Crystal's exercise in bed, the problem isn't only that Sheehan seems too normative, or that she sounds too much like culture-of-poverty-school thinkers such as the sociologist Oscar Lewis. It's that she sounds too much like Dorothy Parker. In other words, she echoes a quite different New Yorker legacy: not "clinical," as her critics commonly complain, but acerbic, blasé, even mordant. 17 All that being said, we also shouldn't underestimate the cumulatively corrosive effects of the foster care system itself on the kinds of social disengagement that journalists or their informants exhibit. We might well be wary of using sentiment or "attachment" as the readerly norm always in play. Instead, as both Bernstein and Sheehan suggest, perhaps the detachment or dissociation that young people in foster care can exhibit reflects only what failed governance has produced in them. Or, perhaps more precisely, reproduced. For after all, from one perspective, a Shirley Wilder, or a Lamont Wilder, or a Crystal Taylor are indeed lost children, if not exactly foundlings. But more precisely they also come of age, in foster care, in their adolescence, when they are already liable to be cultivating a hard veneer of evasiveness, resentment, or disbelief. Or, in some instances, they are themselves developing an affected blasé. Perhaps, therefore, Sheehan deemed Crystal Taylor her "favorite" not only because Crystal assigned herself a lovability the system often denied her. Perhaps it was also because that young woman reflected back, as the interior angles of a crystal will, some of Sheehan's own detachment from a system both fostering and abandoning its charges, often in the same breath. And as both books demonstrate, it is the illogic and stagnation of this system that proves so daunting. This may be why it seems, as Crystal might have said, we always seem to be ending and starting all over again. And it is hard for anyone-a young person, a character, a journalist or even a reader-to get very attached to that. called "ethnographic realism," see Kramer (1995) and Wilson (2011). 4 In speaking of the contrasting forms of Sheehan and Bernstein as different narrative modes, I am following the thinking of Agustin Zarzosa, who offers this term to refer to both the rhetorical strategies that traverse genres and the discursive models that regulate "our knowledge of reality" (2010, 237) . By "disposition," I am reflecting Pierre Bourdieu's (1993) usage. 5 On the centrality of theories of emotional attachment to foster care, see Beam (2013, 35-36) ; Elizabeth Bartholet (e.g., 1999, 95) ; Rutter and O'Connor (1999) . 6 Such an approach is often designed, via direct address, to evoke inspiration and pathos-and, more to the point, as Martha Shirk's On Their Own puts it, to "bring to life . . . otherwise numbing statistics." "We hope," Shirk adds, "that you will be inspired by the tenacity, resilience, and perseverance that these young people display in the face of numerous obstacles. But we expect, too, that your heart will ache as you read of the lingering effects of abuse or neglect and their bewilderment" (2006, 3). 7 Some private institutions, it should be said, never join a system at all, in order to avoid Civil Rights regulation (see Toth 1997, 29-30) . 8 On a recent press-coverage controversy about Native American reservations, see Edward Schumacher-Matos (2013). Michael Rutter and Thomas G. O'Connor report "some suggestion" in the scholarship that emotional and behavioral disturbances are higher among children in the system than among non-fostered children from similarly high-risk backgrounds (1999, 830) . 9 Reflecting the varied choices a writer might make, even the adjectival form of "Dickensian," in popular circulation since the nineteenth century, has referred variously to a particular kind of fictional character, to grim social conditions, or to a style of Christmas (see Slater 2004) . These days, newsrooms habitually use the shorthand adjective to refer, contradictorily, either to sentimental renderings of poverty or the harsh conditions Dickens actually attacked: class polarization, bureaucratic stagnation, and institutional neglect of the young. See, for example, Lew Hollman (2002) . 10 In the first third of the book, Shirley actually escapes one foster-care institution by running through a graveyard (Bernstein 2002, 15) , a scene that became one of the inspirations for Bernstein's research (see 448). 11 "I tend to put my emotions into my life and not my work," Sheehan once told an interviewer; "I have a temperament that is much too middle of the road [for partisanship]" (quoted in Rubin 1984) . "Third-person invisible" is from an interview with the Chicago Tribune, cited in "Susan Sheehan" (2002). 12 Jessica Burstein (2002) has provided an especially instructive portrait of this blasé mode in her discussion of Dorothy Parker. See note 17 below, as well. 13 This effect is in fact an old New Yorker standby: as Lillian Ross had announced the code in the 1940s, interior thoughts should be considered "unreportable" (1983, 10). 14 Compare Bernstein's account of Lamont's complaint when he sees others being cared for in Astor Home, whereas he himself had not been (2002, 362) . 15 Scholars otherwise as much in disagreement as John Hartsock (2002) , Mark Kramer (1995) , and Doug Underwood (2013) actually concur that these realist norms commonly dominate the study of literary journalism; contrast Wilson (2011) . 16 Conservatives, for instance, sometimes reinforce more normative ideals of nuclear family life by drawing on Bowlby's theories of attachment to attack institutional care. Generally, this complaint overlooks Bowlby's own insistence that social institutions bore the same responsibility as
